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The proposition that the Constitution needs to be rewritten begs a
critical question-namely what the Constitution is. If we posit that by
Constitution we mean the rules drafted by the Philadelphia Convention
of 1787 as amended in accordance with Article V of those rules, the
argument that many of those rules are out of date and need to be replaced
is a powerful one. This inadequacy appears in the powers they grant, the
powers they do not grant, some of the limitations they impose on public
decisions, and some limitations they ought to impose but do not. No
matter how sensible they were for the eighteenth century, changes with
respect, at least, to geography, demographics, technology, and prevailing
values make current problems of governance substantially different from
those confronting the original enactors. And, notwithstanding the regular
invocation of the Constitution as expressing the authentic will of "We the
People,"' every passing decade makes the existence of such a popular
endorsement increasingly rhetorical. I also assume, for the sake of this
Essay, that the original Constitution's own procedures for rewriting in
Article V are practically unavailable to make the changes necessary to
correct these deficiencies.2
If we accept that the Constitution (as defined) needs to be rewritten,
we must then ask how it should be rewritten. I discuss two methods in
the balance of this Essay. The first is to write and adopt a new text from
scratch. The second is to maintain the existing text but to reinterpret its
rules so as to make it better fit with modem realities. Each of these
methods, however, suffers from serious problems.
I. METHOD ONE: STARTING OVER
Having decided that the existing Constitution is inadequate and that
amendment is an insufficient response, the most obvious next step might
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of
Law.
1. See U.S. CONST. pnbl.
2. See, e.g., Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of
Article V, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1029, 1046-51 (2014) (noting that "the requirements of Article
V [are] practically impossible to meet").
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be simply to start over, to write a new constitution. The enactors could
select those features of the old constitution that appear to have
continuing utility. They could also borrow features from other more
recently written constitutions. This kind of constitution writing is more
or less routine in the nations of the world.3 If we honestly think we need
a new constitution, why should we not undertake such a project?
We usually make law under an authority and according to
procedures that are themselves defined by superior law. A statute tells us
how to make regulations; a constitution tells us how to make statutes.
But there is no such thing as a law that tells us how to make
constitutions.' The authority for constitution making, therefore, must
derive from something other than law-something essentially political.
Writing a new constitution necessarily involves abandonment, that is to
say, repudiation of the prior constitution. (Only in treatises are
governments instituted in a lawless state of nature.) A thorough
constitutional rewriting demands an especially intense political
motivation. It requires a widespread conviction that the old constitutional
rules are no longer satisfactory and an equally broad agreement on the
principles that ought to guide design of the replacement.' The resulting
new constitution would have a far more credible claim to be an authentic
act of "the People" subject to it than does our current original
Constitution, written and approved by people long dead.
The main obstacle to rewriting the United States Constitution is less
disagreement on what the new charter should contain (though, in the
event, that would also be a formidable problem) than a distinct reluctance
to discard the existing Constitution. Every change of constitution is a
risky enterprise. It was not without reason that the drafters of the
Declaration of Independence acknowledged that "all [e]xperience hath
shewn, that [m]ankind are more disposed to suffer, while [e]vils are
sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the [florms to which
they are accustomed."6 And with respect to the United States
Constitution that reluctance is likely to be especially pronounced. That is
3. Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law
and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. CoMP. L. 895, 905 (2008).
4. Some constitutions provide distinct procedures for amendment to the
constitution and replacement. See, e.g., C.E., B.O.E. n. 311.1, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). It is
an interesting but ultimately unanswerable question as to whether such a replacement,
enacted according to the prescribed procedure, should be considered a new constitution.
See Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. CoMp. L. 715, 725-27 (2011).
5. Such critical attention to fundamental matters of constitutional design
shares much with Bruce Ackerman's device of a "constitutional moment" applicable both
to formal and informal constitutional change. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE 133 (1991). I refer here only to the explicit abandonment of one constitution and
its replacement with another.
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
26
Two Ways to Rewrite the Constitution
because the American population has come to view the Constitution as
the basis for much of what makes the nation worthy of allegiance.
Devotion to the Constitution has become an essential component of
patriotism. And it is clear that the Constitution that serves this essential
role is not some notional charter but the actual written document
containing the eighteenth century rules and their amendments.
Congresswoman Barbara Jordan became a national hero in the Nixon
impeachment hearings in 1974 when she said: "My faith in the
Constitution is whole, it is complete, it is total. I am not going to sit here
and be an idle spectator to the diminution, the subversion, the destruction
of the Constitution."7
This belief in the critical role that the Constitution plays in national
well-being is admittedly not fully informed by the content of the actual
rules and procedures in the constitutional text. The population's
ignorance of the Constitution's contents is routinely documented in
public opinion polls.' We have, therefore, a disconnect between the
public's estimate of the importance of the original Constitution and the
opinion they might hold if they were to read it carefully and
dispassionately. It might conceivably be possible to correct the popular
misunderstanding of the written rules. But until that happens, no aspiring
political leader is likely to adopt an anti-Constitution platform.
All of this suggests that a total or near total constitutional
replacement-no matter how logical-may simply be off the table. Such
a leap into the unknown would require endorsement by a process
representative enough to claim the emphatic approval of the existing
"people" That is something that, given the broad popular attachment to
the imagined Constitution-erroneously associated with the original
Constitution-is a practical impossibility.
II. METHOD Two: BIT BY BIT
The second way of rewriting the original Constitution is the way we
actually have been rewriting it for more than 200 years. That is by
rule-altering judgments of public actors, most notably by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The rules that emerge from the decisions of
these agents are effectively enforced in the name of the Constitution even
though they depart substantially from the original rules as amended. We
7. Congresswoman Barbara Jordan, Statement at the U.S. House Judiciary
Commrittee Impeachment Hearings (July 25, 1974), available at GIFTS OF SPEECH,
http://gos.sbc.edu/j/jordan3.htil.
8. For a summary of recent findings, see Americans Know Surprisingly Little
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might, of course, describe this process in a different way; it is in the
nature of the Constitution to be constantly changing and, therefore, no
real rewriting has taken place. The somewhat misleading metaphors for
this phenomenon are "the living Constitution" or sometimes "the
common law Constitution."9
Whatever the label applied to it, we are talking about the same
process. There is a fixed set of textual rules that, accurately understood,
apply to designated activities. Certain officials, usually referring to some
array of values then apply different rules to one or more of those
activities citing, though not actually applying, the original text. As noted,
the principal agency responsible for this process has been the Supreme
Court. That Court has claimed for itself the exclusive right to decide the
meaning of the Constitution, and this claim has been largely accepted.'o
This ongoing, covert, and piecemeal rewriting of the Constitution by
(mainly) the Court has certain advantages. It allows the fundamental
rules to be kept roughly up to date. It does this, moreover, without the
intense, dramatic, and sometimes dangerous context of a wholesale
constitutional revolution. It allows constitutional change to proceed
incrementally and therefore permits the continuous evaluation and
reevaluation of previous constitutional experiments. In a country like the
United States, moreover, this kind of constitutional revision by courts fits
comfortably with the well-established and broadly accepted process of
common law lawmaking by courts.
This way of rewriting the Constitution, however, also raises some
serious problems. A constitution is not just a collection of rules. It is
supposed to be an integrated system of grants of power and limitations of
power that make sense in a given time and place. It ought, therefore, to
create a coherent functioning state, one appropriate for the population
that will be subject to it. A constitution, therefore, needs to be designed.
Common lawyers once thought that, over time, the decisions of judges
would gradually and more or less automatically, evolve into a thorough
and rational system of rules: the common law "works itself pure."" That
time, however, has long passed, and almost everyone recognizes that the
rules that emerge from adjudication, like those arising from legislation,
are exercises of human will. Moreover, because of the peculiar,
episodic-one might say haphazard-nature of constitutional litigation,
the resulting set of rules taken together, can hardly be described as
resulting from the exercise of one intelligible will. It is a far cry, that is,
from what Sieys saw as essential to genuine constitution making, the
9. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); see also JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
10. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
11. Omychund v. Barker, [1744] 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (H.L.) [23].
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expression of "a common will [arising from] a willing and acting
body." 2
This incremental constitution making exhibits another related
defect. A critical purpose of a written constitution is to settle, in advance,
and for some extended period of time, the things that the State may and
may not do to individual citizens. Even apart from the actual powers
granted and the limits imposed, it must provide some reliable definition
of the sphere of potential public interference. This accords the people
subject to it the capacity to make plans with some confidence that those
plans will have a chance to come to fruition. 3 The prospect of rewriting
a constitution, month to month, or year to year is utterly inconsistent with
this central reason for having a constitution. It is true that these
transformations of the Constitution will be gradual and fairly predictable
to anyone who pays attention to the decisions announcing them. This is a
standard defense of common law adjudication. But opinions have always
differed as to just how orderly the common law process really is. Lord
Coke thought "the common law itself[] is nothing else but reason: which
is . . . perfection of reason."" But Jeremy Bentham believed that "[a]s a
[s]ystem of general rules," it was "a thing merely imaginary, and for
T. E. Holland it was simply "chaos with a full index."'" On the latter
view at least, a constitution that is routinely rewritten is hardly a
constitution at all.
Perhaps the most serious charge against this way of rewriting the
Constitution involves its legitimacy. Like most modem constitutions, the
United States Constitution occupies the highest level in the hierarchy of
law. Insofar as its meaning is committed to the judiciary, moreover, the
last word in many critical collective decisions belongs to the court of last
resort. The conventional justification for this allocation of decision
making is that the judges are only implementing the rules of the
Constitution. And the Constitution controls any other public acts because
it has issued from the most legitimate source of authority in the legal
system. In the United States (and in almost every other modem
constitutional system) there is overwhelming agreement that this source
12. EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 121, 130-31 (S.E.
Finer ed., M. Blondel trans., 1963) (1789).
13. See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, 16, 22-24 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998).
14. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND § 138 (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 1st American ed. 1812).
15. JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries, in A COMMENT ON
THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 3, 119 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., 1977).
16. THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, ESSAYS UPON THE FORM OF THE LAW 171
(London, Butterworths 1870).
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is the will of "the People." There are multiple serious problems with this
attribution, consideration of which would unduly extend this Essay."
But, as noted in the previous section, the dogma of the Constitution as
the authentic act of "We the People" has lost little of its appeal as a
proper basis for legitimizing the Constitution." But the second kind of
rewritten Constitution, having been formed by adding, deleting, and
substituting rules in litigation decided by unelected and unrepresentative
judges, has just about no claim to be the work of "the People" in the
sense broadly held by today's population.
I conclude, therefore, that an examination of the question of whether
or not the Constitution needs to be rewritten leaves us on the horns of a
dilemma. The original Constitution is demonstrably unsuitable for the
needs of a twenty-first century state. We cannot live within the confines
of those original rules. But there is no way to secure a new more
appropriate constitution that does not present its own formidable
difficulties. An explicit and wholesale rewriting appears politically
impossible due to the popular mystique surrounding the original
Constitution and the process that was supposed to have created it. The
implicit piecemeal rewriting executed in the course of constitutional
litigation, on the other hand, results in an effective constitution that is
unplanned, uncertain, and illegitimate.
How serious is this problem? Obviously, it is less than grave. The
United States functions in a reasonably competent way, although some of
the more explicit-and, therefore, harder to interpret our way out
of-provisions create noticeable inconveniences. The government
continues to operate fairly effectively through an ill-defined sharing of
power between the political branches and the courts. It does so, however,
without the stable protective constraint which is supposed to be the
central virtue of a constitutionalist state. It is perhaps ironic that, at the
same time, it derives much of its perceived authority from the
constitutional text that it has largely left behind.
17. See Kay, supra note 4, at 735-55.
18. For example, the "We the People" motto is prominently displayed at the
new National Constitutional Center in Philadelphia. See National Constitution Center,
VISIT PHILA., http://www.visitphilly.com/museums-attractions/philadelphia/national-
constitution-center/ (last visited Jan 23, 2015).
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